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COMMENTS
EMPLOYER WITHDRAWAL FROM MULTI-EMPLOYER
BARGAINING UNITS: A PROPOSAL FOR
SELF-REGULATION
Multi-employer bargaining typically occurs when several em-
ployers in one industry join an association to negotiate with a single
union.' Small employers in highly competitive businesses are usu-
ally eager to bargain through an association because it enables them
to present a united front against a union which would otherwise
have considerable power to coerce individual employers.2 Many
unions favor bargaining with an employer association both because
it enhances union security 3 and because muld-employer bargaining
assures uniform wages and working conditions throughout the
bargaining unit 4 If both the employer and the union consent to
' Multi-employer bargaining accounts for 42% of the major (1,000 employees or
more) collective bargaining agreements in this country, and covers over 3,000,000
workers. BUREAU oF LABoR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABoR, CEARAcTERnsTIcs
oF MAJOR COLLEcTIV BAtc~nm-N AGREEMENTS 12 table 1.8 (Bulletin No. 2065,
April 1980). These agreements exhibit great variety in the business of employers,
the geographical area, and the extent of the industry included. N. CAimELA
& J. KuHN, CoLLEcrrvE BABGAXNn= 229-31 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Cor.EcnE BAnG AII].
The classic definition of multi-employer bargaining is found in Rains, Legal
Aspects and Problems of Multi-Employer Bargaining, 34 B.U.L. REv. 159 (1954):
[tihe term multiple employer bargaining refers to all situations in which
two or more independent employers bargain or negotiate jointly, through
an agent, committee or association, with one or more labor organizations
representing employees of the several employers, with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
Id. 160.
A multi-employer unit should be distinguished from a multi-plant unit, where
one employer bargains with a union or unions representing workers employed in
various locations.
2 See Somers, Pressures on an Employers' Association in Collective Bargaining,
6 Ius. & LAB. RE. REv. 557, 568 (1963) ("When production is small-scale,
competition intense, and employer interests relatively homogenous, association-wide
bargaining can provide the benefits of stabilization through wage uniformity and of
an increase in bargaining power relative to the union."); see also infra notes 19-29
and accompanying text.
3The union's security is increased because in order to replace an incumbent, a
rival union must win one half of the employees in the entire unit. In individual
bargaining, a union can be decertified by a majority vote of workers at a particular
plant. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
4 Standardization of wages helps prevent the discontent that arises when some
employees earn more wages than do others in the industry for the same work.
See Comment, The Status of Multiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 1967 DunE L.J. 558, 560-61. See generally Somers, supra note 2.
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multi-employer bargaining,5 the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) certifies a multi-employer bargaining unit on the
theory that such arrangements promote industrial stability.6
This Comment focuses on employer withdrawal from multi-
employer units. The current Board rule effectively permits an
employer to withdraw at any time before bargaining begins, and
at no time thereafter. This rule is both too lenient and too strict.
It is too lenient because it allows individuals employers to withdraw
from the unit for any reason before bargaining begins.7 The
Board's rule is also too lenient because it permits individual em-
ployers to make interim agreements with the union, posing a threat
to bargaining unit stability.8 An interim agreement is a tentative
contract offered by the union to a struck employer, containing a
provision requiring the employer to accept whatever terms the
union and the multi-employer unit ultimately agree upon.9 By
signing an interim agreement, a struck employer can return to work,
luring customers from its former comrades. The union benefits
not only because the association's bargaining position is weakened,
but also because union members who return to work after an
interim agreement is signed contribute to the strike fund that sup-
ports members striking other employers. In spite of these benefits
to the union and the settling employer, nonsettling employers are
not permitted to withdraw from the multi-employer unit after their
association colleagues sign interim agreements.
Finally, the rule is too strict because once contract negotiations
begin, an individual employer may withdraw only if it obtains con-
sent of the union, or under narrowly defined "unusual circum-
stances." 10 In short, the Board's rule does not allow the union to
5 See NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966)
("Multi-employer bargaining is based on the consent of the parties to treat with
one another through the agreed units."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); see
also Electric Theatre, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1351, 1352 (1966) (establishment of a
multi-employer unit requires "a controlling history of collective bargaining on such
basis, or an unequivocal agreement of the parties to bind themselves to a course
of group bargaining in the future."); COImrcnvE BARGAINNG, supra note 1, at
243 ("If two parties agree upon a unit, the Board usually confirms it. .. .").
6 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); STAFF oF GEN.
Suacom v. ON LABOR OF TBE HousE Commos. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88TH
CONG., 21) SEss., MULTIEMILOyER BAnGAnuNG AND rrs IMPACT ON Tm CoL. EcTIVE
BARGAING M PRocEss 32 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as Commnr=E
PRITr].
7Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958).
8 Sangamo Construction Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 159 (1971).
9 Id. 160.
10 Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. at 395. For a general discussion of the Board's
withdrawal rule, see Comment, Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Bargaining-Re-
considering Retail Associates, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 464 (1967).
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formulate reasonable expectations about the size or stability of the
unit before negotiations begin. Nor does it allow employers to
escape from the unit after negotiations begin, regardless of develop-
ments in the employer's business or in the bargaining process.
In response to these weaknesses in the Board's rule, and its
perceived pro-union bias, four circuit courts fashioned a doctrine
permitting employer withdrawal whenever an impasse in bargain-
ing occurred. 1 The courts reasoned that impasse, like fragmenta-
tion of the unit or severe employer economic distress,'2 was an
"unusual circumstance." The Board consistently opposed the im-
passe doctrine,'13 and the doctrine was criticized because of the
difficulty of defining when impasse occurs and the impasse standard's
susceptability to manipulation by both unions and employers. 4
The Supreme Court recently rejected the impasse doctrine in
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB. 1 5 The Court
refused to consider the appropriate balance of employer and union
interests, reasoning that it must defer to the Board's balancing of
"confficting legitimate interests." 16 Responding to the assertion
that the Board's current rule favored union interests over employer
interests, the Court declared that "the Board . . . has developed a
rule which, although it may deny an employer a particular economic
weapon, does so in the interest of the proper and pre-eminent goal,
maintaining the stability of the multi-employer unit." 17
This Comment agrees with the rejection of the impasse doc-
trine. It suggests, however, that the Bonanno Court did not go far
enough; because employers need different types of associations, no
public rule can possibly accommodate the diverse interests and
policies involved in regulating withdrawal.
Employers who believe that they benefit from individual bar-
gaining seek a loosely structured association, and would be ham-
11H & D, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
3570 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1982); NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582
F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck
Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc.,
500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974). But see infra note 67 (two circuits recently aban-
doned impasse doctrine; three circuits retain it).
12 See infra notes 59-60.
13 Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22 (1973), enforcement denied, 500
F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974).
14See Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 1 (1977); Recent Developments, 44 FoarmA L. REv. 1256 (1976). But
see Annual Survey of Labor Law-Withdrawal of Multi-Employer Units Upon
Impasse: Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 21 B.C.L. REv. 85, 126 (1979).
1550 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982), aff'g 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980).
16 50 U.S.L.W. at 4091.
17 Id.
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pered by a rule severely limiting withdrawal. Employers who seek
security and certainty desire a static and cohesive bargaining group,
and their expectations would be frustrated by a liberal withdrawal
rule. Therefore, this Comment proposes private ordering as an
alternative to an administratively or judicially established with-
drawal rule.
In a private regulation scheme, associations would design their
own written agreement governing all aspects of members' behavior,
including withdrawal. If the contract provisions were not contrary
to public policy, and the union agreed to bargain with the asso-
ciation, the NLRB would certify the unit. The association would
thus become an "employer," and withdrawal contrary to the terms
of the agreement would be an unfair labor practice.' 8
Part I of this Comment explains why employers and unions
agree to engage in multi-employer bargaining, and why they might
wish to withdraw from a multi-employer unit. Part II examines
the Board's rule on withdrawal and the impasse doctrine, explain-
ing why both are theoretically and practically inadequate. Part III
proposes self-regulation as a solution, and discusses the implementa-
tion of such a system.
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING
A. The Advantages to Employers
Employers bargaining through an association enjoy three ad-
vantages unavailable to employers bargaining individually. The
foremost advantage is size, for labor negotiations are no exception
to the rule that "there is strength in numbers." Small employers
facing strong national unions are typically in a weak bargaining
position.' 9 The union can force them to succumb to its demands
by threatening a strike. Smaller employers usually lack the eco-
nomic resources to withstand a long work stoppage, and know the
crippling effect of strikes in terms of business lost to competitors.
18 Withdrawal in defiance of a self-regulation agreement would be a violation
of § 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1976), forbidding refusal to bargain collectively with the representative of the
employer. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; cf. Teamsters Local 378,
243 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1089 (1979) (unfair labor practice for union to negotiate
separate settlement without the multi-employer association's consent), application
for enforcement pending, No. 79-7683 (9th Cir. argued Nov. 5, 1980).
19S GaS.rR & L. Tnpi,, MANAGEMENT PRoBLEMs IAPrcrr IN MUvrr-
EAELOyER B. ncaGAOc 3 (1949); C. KERR & R. RANDALL, CoLLECTrv B. -icANG
N Tm PAcInc CoAsT PuLP AND PAE'R INDUsTRY 2-4 (1948); Comment, supra
note 4, at 559.
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Multi-employer bargaining allows these employers to improve
their bargaining posture by presenting a united front against the
union.20 Increased size increases the employers' bargaining leverage,
because the union cannot be sure that it will prevail in a strike,
and because employers need not fear losing business to competitors,
who are also being struck.21 The economies of scale accompanying
increased size also benefit employers by allowing them-through the
association-to design a more sophisticated bargaining strategy 2
and to provide employees with more benefits.
2 3
Besides economic advantages, employers benefit from group
bargaining because it permits the use of lockouts to counteract
whipsaw strikes.24  In a whipsaw strike, the union strikes employers
one by one, waiting until each employer capitulates before striking
the next.25 In NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449,26 the Supreme
Court held that all association members in a multi-employer unit
could lock their employees out of the workplace, effectively nullify-
ing the whipsaw strike.97  Although single employers may lock
employees out for a legitimate business reason, 2  multi-employer
associations are unique because employers may lock their employees
out solely to support a struck fellow employer.2 9
20 See NLB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1957) (multi-
employer bargaining "has had its greatest expansion since enactment of the Wagner
Act because employers have sought through group bargaining to match increased
union strength").
21 See generally CommrTEEPn Tr, supra note 6, at 1-19.
22For example, employers can pool their resources and hire a skilled negotiator.
Comment, supra note 4, at 561.
23These benefits include, for example, pension plans, medical benefits, unem-
ployment compensation and industry-wide apprenticeship and training programs.
See Comment, supra note 4, at 561; Herold, Multiemployer Bargaining and the
Whipsaw Strike: The Use of a Lockout as an Economic Weapon, 21 BnoorLYN
BAtrus m 54, 54-55 (1969).
24 See Brundage, The Lockout and Multi-Employer Bargaining, 14 LAB. L.J.
976, 977 (1963); Comment, supra note 4, at 559-60; see also Recent Developments,
supra note 14, at 1257 (concluding that preventing whipsaw strikes is the most
significant protection gained by an employer in multi-employer bargaining).
25The union benefits from the struck employer's fear of losing customers to
local competitors. Herold, supra note 23, at 54. Striking employees may benefit
from a strike fund contributed to by locals whose members continue to work and by
employees of employers who have capitulated to the whipsaw strike. Id.
26 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
27 Id. 97. The Court noted that multi-employer bargaining was crucial to the
"effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened
collective bargaining." Id. 95.
28 American Ship Building Co. v. NLBB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
29 Truck Drivers, 383 U.S. at 79. Employers may also prefer multi-employer
bargaining because it circumvents "irresponsible" local unions. The employers
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B. Advantage for Unions
Besides requiring agreement from individual employers, certi-
fication of a multi-employer bargaining unit requires union con-
sent. A union will only agree to bargain in this fashion when the
cost of increased employer strength is outweighed by union benefits.
Union advantages involving economies of scale, as with increased
welfare benefits 30 and more efficient bargaining, 1 are comparable
to employers' advantages. Unions also secure guaranteed uni-
formity of wages and working conditions throughout the unit,
rather than being forced to negotiate with each employer separately
over such terms.
The most important advantage for unions is enhanced security.
Once certified by the Board, a union representing a multi-employer
unit is, in practice, almost impossible to supplant. Even for another
union to call for a decertification election requires the formidable
task of securing the signatures of thirty percent of the employees
across the entire bargaining unit.3 3 Decertification requires a major-
ity vote of employees in the unit.3 Thus, even if every employee
in a plant votes against the incumbent union, it will continue to
represent the employees unless more than half of the total number
of employees in the unit vote for decerdfication.s
bargaining with the national union may seek to persuade it to eliminate rules that
are troublesome to the employers at the local level. Cor.L cTsvE BARG ADMG, supra
note 1, at 252-53. But see NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.
1969) (requiring employer member of an association to bargain on local matters
with local union.).
30 See supra note 23.
31 The union's greatest efficiency is negotiation of a single contract instead of a
series of contracts. It has also been suggested that multi-employer bargaining may
involve high-level company policy makers, giving the union greater access to those
who make controlling decisions. CoLrT c=Z BARGArING, supra note 1, at 253-54.
32 J. ABODx.Ly, R. HIlAMmmi & A. SANDLra, THE NLRB AND nu APPioPI ATE
BARGANING UNGUr 218-19 (rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as APPnopmTE BAR-
cGAINc UNIT]; R. GoRMANu~, BAsic TE=T ON LAnor LAw 87 (1976). Wages and
payments to insure safe working conditions often represent a significant part of the
cost of the final product. But if unions or employers attempt to skimp on these
items, there may be severe repercussions in the work force. See G. BLOOM & H.
NoRTHmRu, EcoNomics OF LABor R ArONs 211-14 (8th ed. 1977); CoIcrEcnv
BARcAuNG, supra note 1, at 247. See generally T. KENNEDY, TH Sc FcANcE
OF WAGE UiFonMrrY (1949).
33NLA, § 9(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1976).
34 Id.
35 Joseph J. Callier, 243 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 595 (8th
Cir. 1980); Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964), enforced, 357
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Of course, the process can also work against the incumbent: a rival union can
take over a unit if it wins the majority of votes across the unit, even if it does not
[Vol. 130:689
EMPLOYER WITHDRAWAL
C. The Pressures to Withdraw
After voluntarily entering into an association, an employer may
be persuaded by changing conditions that a return to individual
bargaining would prove beneficial.30 Unexpected economic develop-
ments may prompt the change of heart.a7 Or, an employer may
discover that its views on bargaining strategy differ radically from
those of other association members and that it has insufficient power
within the organization to implement those views.
The withdrawal of other association members may also provide
the motivation for employer withdrawal.3 8 In these cases, the ulti-
mate composition of the unit fails to conform to the employer's
original expectations. Permanent withdrawal by important mem-
bers of the association may reduce the group's bargaining leverage
making the independence available to an employer in individual
bargaining more desirable.
Temporary withdrawal, precipitated by individual interim
agreements between association members and the union, may also
lead nonsettling employers to seek to withdraw. Association mem-
bers signing interim agreements are bound to the final association
contract, and are thus still members of the association.3 9 Their
temporary withdrawal, however, may reduce the association's effec-
tiveness even more than permanent withdrawals because interim
gain majority support in every plant. This occurred in the pulp and paper industry
in 1964, as the Western Pulp and Paper Workers ousted the AFL-CIO after 30 years
of representation. C. BLOOM & H. NoRTnmur, supra note 32, at 214.
The advantages gained by unions and employers from multi-employer bargain-
ing are not produced cost-free. Employees and consumers bear special costs from
the arrangement Employees find that enhanced union security reduces their free
choice in selecting bargaining representatives. A union may join a multi-employer
unit without consulting the employees. Although the employees might have
opposed the decision, favoring local autonomy, their only chance to defeat the
union would be at a unit-wide election.
Consumers may find that multi-employer bargaining increases the price that
they pay for goods and services produced by that industry. Competing producers
bargaining together can easily pass on increased wages directly to consumers. They
risk, however, being undersold by competitors who do not belong to the association,
or by producers of competing goods.
136"The boundary lines of bargaining units are not fixed and unchanging, but
variable, the parties in collective bargaining adjusting them to fit their needs."
CoLi cTIrVE BAcAI-nN, supra note 1, at 263.
37For example, the demand for a certain product may decrease dramatically,
changing the size and type of bargaining units. See id. 248-52.
SsAs members leave an association, its bargaining strength declines. The
employer may then become more concerned with getting out of the weakened
association than with bargaining. See S. GAmmT & L. TramP, supra note 19, at 60.
39 See NLBB v. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. Inc., 630 F.2d 25, 30 (ist
Cir. 1980), aff'd 50 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982).
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agreements are usually reached at a critical juncture in bargaining,
or during a strike.40  With an interim agreement, the settling em-
ployer remains in operation, taking customers from struck members,
and destroying the expectations of mutual support which inspired
formation of the unit.
4 '
II. THE CURRENT LAW
A. The Board's Rules for Multi-employer Bargaining
1. Certification of Multi-employer Units
Since its inception, the NLRB has assumed the power to certify
multi-employer bargaining units, 42 and its authority to do so has
withstood challenges in Congress 43 and before the Supreme Court.44
4 0 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 378, 243 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1088-89 (1979), appli-
cation for enforcement pending, No. 79-7683 (9th Cir. argued Nov. 5, 1980);
Plumbers & Steamfitters Union 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592 (1971); Sangamo Con-
struction Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 159 (1971).
41 See Recent Developments, supra note 14, at 1262:
The individual employer who agrees to a separate contract or "interim
agreement" weakens the strength of the association. In addition, as [its]
employees return to work, pressure is brought to bear on the remaining
employers to accede to the union's demands or face competitive dis-
advantage. The resulting whipsaw effect on the multiemployer association
leaves it with considerably less bargaining power.
4 2 The NRLA never mentions multi-employer bargaining, despite the fact that
bargaining on that basis took place before the Wagner Act was enacted. See
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1957). The Board derived
its power to approve such units in Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938),
appeal dismissed sub nom. AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd,
308 U.S. 401 (1940), reasoning from § 9(b) of the NLRA. That section states:
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). The Board held that
because "employer" includes "any person acting as an agent of an employer," 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), and "person" includes "associations," 29 U.S.C. § 152(1)
(1976), it could designate an association as the statutory representative of the em-
ployers. See Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. at 1024-25.
4SWhen Congress was considering the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.), multi-employer bargaining was a hotly debated issue. The
Senate tried to authorize the Board to certify industry-wide units entered voluntarily
by employers. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1947). The House
Committee opposed multi-employer bargaining, and attempted to impose severe
limitations upon the Board's power to authorize it. H.R. R,. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 552-53 (1947). Neither provision was passed, so legislative intent about
the scope of multi-employer bargaining is unclear.
44 In NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Supreme
Court interpreted the legislative silence on the issue as an endorsement of the
Board's policy. Id. 95-96.
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Because national labor policy presumptively favors individual bar-
gaining,45 the Board will certify multi-employer units only if both
the association members and the union manifest "an unequivocal
intention to be bound in collective bargaining by group rather than
individual action." 46
The Board requires that this manifestation of intention be
"something less . . . than a solemnly executed document signed
and sealed with hot wax.... An employer who, through a course
of conduct or otherwise, signifies that it has authorized the group to
act in its behalf will be bound by that apparent creation of au-
thority."47  Thus, the Board looks primarily to the parties' bar-
gaining history in deciding whether to certify a multi-employer
unit.48
If the parties have bargained jointly, and abided by the results
of negotiations in the past, a multi-employer unit will probably be
certified.49 In some situations, however, the union or particular
employers may no longer want to bargain on a multi-employer basis.
Nevertheless, if the Board decides that bargaining history controls,
the parties may be bound to the unit despite their contrary
preference.P0
Employers who negotiate together informally may discover,
despite the absence of an association, that they are members of a
multi-employer unit. 1 Thus, if certain policies are worked out as a
45 Cab Operating Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 878, 879 (1965); Carbondale Retail
Druggists' Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1022 (1961); John Breuner Co., 129 N.L.R.B.
394, 396 (1960).
4
6Joseph McDaniel, 226 N.L.R.B. 851, 852 (1976) (footnote omitted), en-
forced sub nom. NLB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977); see Bill
O'Grady Carpet Serv., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 587 (1970); Korner Kale, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 1157 (1966); Fairbanks Dairy, 146 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964).
4 7 joseph McDaniel, 226 N.L.R.B. at 853 (footnote omitted).
48 E.g., Electric Theatre, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1351 (1966); Jahn-Tyler Printing
& Publishing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 167 (1955).
49 "When employers have built up a controlling history of bargaining with
their employees on a multiemployer basis, the Board will almost always certify such
a unit as appropriate." Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777 (1952).
50 See, e.g., Shreveport-Bossier Cleaners & Laundries, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 534
(1959); Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952); Crucible Steel Castings Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 1843 (1950); Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946). See
generally CoLTT cn BAnCAnN, supra note 1, at 243, 244 & n.11. Because of
this prior bargaining history rule, the consensual nature of multi-employer bargaining
has been questioned. See Co~larran PPrNT, supra note 6, at 21; Comment, Multi-
employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board, 66 Hanv. L. REV.
886, 889 (1953); Comment, supra note 4, at 564, 570.
51jseph McDaniel, 226 N.L.R.B. 851 (1976), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977).
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group, but each employer signs a separate contract with the union,52
the Board may rule that the employers are part of a multi-employer
unit.5 3
2. The Board's Withdrawal Rule
Because the right to withdraw from multi-employer units at
will would destroy the stability of bargaining and with it industrial
peace, the Board established a rule governing withdrawal in Retail
Associates.54 Either individual employers or the union may with-
draw at any time before contract negotiations commence, provided
that adequate notice is given. Once negotiations begin, however,
employer withdrawal is permitted only with the consent of the
union, or under "unusual circumstances." 1r The Board has limited
these unusual circumstances to severe economic distress,56 or severe
fragmentation of the bargaining unit.5 7 Despite pressure from cir-
cuit courts, the NLRB has refused to interpret unusual circum-
52 See, e.g., Checker Cab Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1963), enforced, 367
F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
53 In Checker, the cab employers' membership corporation contended that each
employer should bargain with the union separately. The union sought to represent
all employees who drove Checker cabs for any employer. The Board held for
the union, reasoning that:
Checker and its members contend that separate units of each members
employee drivers are appropriate. However, as we have stated above,
Checker and its members seek to establish and preserve the public image
and the operating reality and benefit of a single integrated enterprise.
Pursuant thereto, all the drivers have similar working conditions and
mutual employment interests. In addition, no union seeks to represent
the drivers on any other basis. In view of the above, and in view of our
finding of a joint employer relationship between Checker and each of its
members in one common enterprise under the aegis of Checker, we find a
unit of all employees driving Checker cabs to be appropriate.
141 N.L.R.B. at 587.
Thus, despite the absence of bargaining history or employer consent, the Board
found a multi-employer unit appropriate. This decision implies that an employer
must avoid collaboration with fellow employers on any issue, whether or not related
to negotiations with the union, in order to avoid being bound to a multi-employer
unit. See also McAx Sign Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 957 (1977), enforced, 576 F.2d 62
(5th Cir. 1978) (employer did not formally authorize group bargaining, but Board
and court found that it manifested the intention to bargain through an association
based on prior bargaining history and course of conduct in disputed negotiations),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Quality Limestone Products, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B.
589 (1963); Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946).
54 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
55 Id. 395.
56 See, e.g., Atlas Electrical Serv. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 827, 830 (1969); Spun-Jee
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1968); United States Lingerie-Corp., 170 N.L.R.B.
750, 751 (1968).
57See, e.g., Typographic Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1566 (1978); Connell
Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974).
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stances to include an impasse in bargaining 58 or an individual
employer's signing an interim agreement.5 9
3. The Problems with the Board's Rules
The Board's rules governing multi-employer bargaining units
are compromises between the competing goals of flexibility and
stability. Of at least equal importance, however, is the need for
certainty. The Board's rules do not provide guidelines dear enough
to tell an employer when it is likely to be bound to a multi-employer
unit and when it is not. The resulting uncertainty prevents em-
ployers from making an informed choice whether to engage in
multi-employer bargaining.
The Board's certification rule creates uncertainty both for em-
ployers who wish to bargain through an association and for those
who prefer to bargain individually. Employers attempting to form
an association cannot be sure what history of joint bargaining or of
cooperation is necessary to ensure certification as a multi-employer
unit. In contrast, employers who wish to bargain together in-
formally, or on limited subjects, must be wary of the Board's
misinterpreting their intentions and ordering multi-employer
bargaining.
The Board's withdrawal rule, however, is the major source of
confusion. The ease of withdrawal before negotiations begin may
frustrate the employer who felt assured of the security of a stable,
cohesive bargaining group, only to find other employers seeking
58 Golden Bear Motors, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 300 (1979); Florida Fire Sprinklers,
Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1978); Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1976);
Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22 (1973), enforcement denied 500 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1974).
59The rationale for holding that signing interim agreements does not constitute
an unusual circumstance is that such agreements do not disrupt employers legitimate
expectations about bargaining unit structure. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service,
Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd 50
U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1928); Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22
(1973), enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974).
In addition to holding that impasse and interim agreements are not unusual
circumstances, the Board has ruled that none of the following meet that standard:
an employer's good faith doubts about a union's majority status, Sheridan Creations,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); the discharge of all the employer's workers repre-
sented by the union, John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 154, 156 (1967),
enforced, 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968); separate permanent agreements between
the union and some association members, Tobey Fine Papers, 245 N.L.R.B.
1393, 1395 (1979), enforced, 659 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1981); WE Painters, Inc., 176
N.L.R.B. 964, 965-66 (1969), and a sharp decline in the employer's business.
Serv-All Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1141 (1972), enforcement denied 491 F.2d 1273
(10th Cir. 1974).
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independence by withdrawing on the eve of bargaining. The limits
on withdrawal after negotiations begin present an even more diffi-
cult situation, for the employer who wishes to withdraw can never
be sure how much economic distress must occur 0 o or how badly the
bargaining unit must be fragmented ' before withdrawal can be
accomplished without an unfair labor practice charge.
The rules regulating employer withdrawal based on separate
agreements with the union have also been a source of uncertainty.
Because employers and unions have equal withdrawal rights, 2 a
union may consent to an employer withdrawing at any time. In
addition, a union may in some cases negotiate a separate, permanent
agreement with one employer-effectively allowing that employer to
withdraw from the unit-without endangering multi-employer bar-
gaining0 3 Finally, the union may negotiate interim settlements
with some employers-allowing "temporary withdrawal" from the
unit-without permitting other association members to withdraw
0 4
The Board's rule permits the union to employ the reverse
whipsaw, a potent weapon for dismantling the association's bargain-
ing leverage." In a reverse whipsaw, the union strikes all associa-
tion members, and then one by one offers the employers separate
0 See, e.g., Western Pacific Roofing Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 501 (1979).
61 See Tobey Fine Papers, 245 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1979), enforced on other grounds,
659 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1981) (employer not permitted to withdraw although 2 of
14 association members permanently withdrew; those 2 members employed 42% of
the unit's employees); Birkenwald, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1979) (1 of 11 em-
ployers in unit signed permanent agreement; withdrawal not permitted although that
employer employed 30% of the unit's employees); Connell Typesetting Co., 212
N.L.R.B. 918 (1974) (withdrawal permitted after 23 of 36 employers, employing
173 of 209 employees, permanently withdrew). The Board stated that it did not
consider the degree of bargaining strength to be the determinative factor in frag-
mentation cases. Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. at 1097.
62 Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enforced sub nor. Detroit
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967).
6
3 See, e.g., Tobey Fine Papers, 245 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1395 (1979) ("it does not
follow ipso facto that execution of individual separate final contracts with former
Association members either proves an intention to destroy, or necessarily causes the
fragmentation of, a multiemployer unit."), enforced on other grounds, 659 F.2d 841
(8th Cir. 1981).
64 The Board does not view interim settlements as disruptive of the association.
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979), enforced, 630
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982); Joseph J.
Callier, 243 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1979), enforced, 630 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1980);
Plumbers & Steanfitters Union 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592 (1971); Sangamo Con-
struction Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 159 (1971). The exception to the rule that interim
settlements do not permit withdrawal is when the settlements cause severe frag-
mentation of the bargaining unit See Connell Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918
(1974).
05 See NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 130:689
EMPLOYER WITHDRAWAL
interim agreements. As in the whipsaw strike, the employer has
more incentives to capitulate than to resist. If it accepts an interim
agreement, the employer can return to work without fear of com-
petitive disadvantage; the union will use that agreement as leverage
to settle with the other association members on the same terms.
If the employer refuses, it chances losing customers to the settling
competitors.
The reverse whipsaw gives the union a significant economic
weapon, but employers cannot respond by locking out their em-
ployees. Nor can they withdraw from the association and undertake
individual negotiations with the local. Thus, the union's power to
withhold consent and to offer separate agreements permits it to
decide which employers will be released from the multi-employer
unit, and which will be locked in.60
B. The Courts Respond: The Impasse Doctrine
1. The Rationale for the Doctrine
Responding to the perceived unfairness of the Board's with-
drawal rule, three circuits held that an impasse in bargaining was
an unusual circumstance justifying withdrawal by any employer0 7
Despite the Board's consistent position that an employer attempting
a unilateral withdrawal at impasse committed an unfair labor prac-
tice,68 the courts reasoned that at impasse the union had "two
66A further difficulty with current Board rules is the problem of employee
rights. Although the employees choose the union on a plant-by-plant basis, the
decision to bargain in a multi-employer bargaining unit is made afterwards, without
consulting the employees. Thus, employees opposed to group bargaining may none-
theless be forced into the larger unit. See, e.g., Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331,
1332 n.3 (1952) (citing Belle Vernon Milk Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 717 (1950)). Be-
cause decertification of the union requires majority support across the entire unit,
see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text, employees at one plant may oppose
the group bargaining structure without being able to remove themselves from it.
See generally Brooks, Stability Versus Employee Choice, 61 CoRN=.L L. REV. 344
(1976); Brooks & Thompson, Multiplant Units: The NLRB's Withdrawal of Free
Choice, 20 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 363, 378 (1967).
67NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d
475 (3rd Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
In addition, two other circuits recently abandoned the impasse doctrine. Com-
pare NLRB v. Marine Machine Works, 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981) and Tobey
Fine Papers v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1981) with NLRB v. Hi-Way Bill-
boards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974) and Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471
F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1972).
68 Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1979), enforced,
630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982); Hi-Way
Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22 (1973), enforcement denied, 500 F.2.d 181 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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weapons for its economic arsenal (i.e, the selective strike and indi-
vidual negotiations) while the employers are given only one (viz.,
the lockout)." 19 The impasse doctrine, in the court's view, re-
dressed that imbalance.
The primary rationale for the impasse rule was that the union
could negotiate interim agreements. In refusing to tie withdrawal
rights to the actual negotiation of separate agreements, one court
reasoned that such a rule would give the "party whose right accrues
first . . . a tremendous bargaining advantage and leverage." 70
Instead, the court linked withdrawal to impasse, "an event which
neither [party] can manipulate . . . . 71 A second court embrac-
ing the impasse doctrine based its decision on the view that "the
objectives of collective bargaining would be ill-served by compelling
employers to remain in the bargaining unit once it becomes clear
that no progress is being made within that framework." 72 Both
these courts acknowledged that the impasse doctrine could erode
the stability of multi-employer units, but concluded that an appro-
priate balance of the union's and employer's interests required
adoption of the rule.
2. Rejection of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court recently rejected the impasse doctrine in
favor of the Board's rule. In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, 73 the Supreme Court rejected the impasse doctrine.
In that case, the employer suffered a selective strike, and, although
no interim agreements were signed, informed the association that
it wished to withdraw from the bargaining unit. The employer
refused to sign or be bound by the subsequent contract between
the union and the association.
69 Beck Engraving, 522 F.2d at 483.
70 Id.
71 Id. For a general discussion and criticism of the decision, see Note, Effect
of Negotiating Impasse on an Employer's Right to Withdraw From a Multi-
Employer Bargaining Assoiation-NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 17 B.C. I-rsus.
& Com. L. RIv. 525 (1976).
72NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135, 146 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see
Comment, From Chains of Iron to Ropes of Sand: Employer Withdrawal From
Multiemployer Bargaining After Steel Fabricators, 45 BRooxr.Nr L. REV. 1283
(1979); Annual Survey of Labor Law-Withdrawal of Multi-Employer Units Upon
Impasse: Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 21 B.C.L. REv. 119 (1979).
7350 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982), aff'g 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980).
The rejection of the impasse doctrine follows the recent trend in the courts of
appeals. See supra note 67.
[Vol. 130:689
EMPLOYER WITHDRAWAL
The Court concluded that the Board acted within the pr6per
scope of its authority in finding that the employer committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain. The Court noted that
impasse was generally a "temporary deadlock... in negotiations" 74
which could be resolved through bargaining, and that the notion of
impasse itself was subject to manipulation.75
The Court also accepted the Board's position on interim agree-
ments, holding that neither strikes nor interim agreements are neces-
sarily associated with impasse and that a distinction should be made
between "truly interim" and "separate final" agreements. In the
former case, an employer is bound by the ultimate contract nego-
tiated by the association, while the latter is "'inconsistent with the
concept of multiemployer bargaining units.' "7
3. An Evaluation of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Bonanno was faced with a choice be-
tween two inadequate alternatives. The Board rule dearly favors
unions over employers, 77 prompting Chief Justice Burger in dissent
to suggest that the rule "create[d] an artificial and unwarranted
imbalance of economic weapons." 78
The Chief Justice disputed the majority's suggestion that the
impasse was temporary; he found "a complete breakdown in nego-
tiating coupled with a prolonged strike and lockout." 79 He argued
that forcing the parties to remain in that stalemate would be futile,
and contended that withdrawal at impasse actually facilitates, rather
than frustrates, bargaining.8 0
The Chief Justice also disagreed with the idea that the concept
of impasse is too vague to determine withdrawal rights. He argued
74 50 U.S.L.W. at 4090.
751d. (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. at 1093-94).
76 50 U.S.L.W. at 4090. The Court's rationale for permitting interim agree-
ments was that "all employers, including those executing interim agreements, have
an "equivalent stake' in the final outcome because 'the resulting group agreement
would then apply to all employers, including each signer of an interim agreement"'
Id. (citing Bonanno, 243 N.L.R.B. at 1096).
The Court also agreed with the Board's decision to balance "conflicting legitimate
interests" instead of "economic weapons and bargaining strength." 50 U.S.L.W. at
4091. By contrast, the Chief Justice declined to give "abject deference to the
Board's views." Id. 4092 (dissenting opinion).
77See ArprOPRIATE BARGAIING UNrr, supra note 32, at 235; Murphy, supra
note 14, at 57; Recent Developments, supra note 14, at 1265.
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that "the Board and the courts have acquired considerable experi-
ence in determining whether an impasse exists," 81 and that the
danger that either party will manipulate negotiations to create im-
passe is diminished by the requirement that a statemate be declared
only after good faith negotiations.8 2
The Chief Justice also took issue with the Court's view of in-
terim agreements, disputing the majority's assertion that employers
executing such agreements had "an equivalent stake in promptly
securing a reasonable final agreement." 83 The Chief Justice ex-
plained that employers who had signed interim agreements would
benefit by prolonging the deadlock to increase their competitive
advantage over nonsettling employers.8 4 Combined with the threat
of a reverse whipsaw strike, this gave the union a clear bargaining
advantage. 8
Despite the imbalance perceived by the Chief Justice, com-
mentators are in general agreement that the impasse doctrine creates
more difficulties than it solves.88 This probably explains the trend
in the courts of appeals toward rejection of the doctrine.8 7 Those
courts, and the commentators, have rested their rejection of the
doctrine on the rationale that a primary purpose of multi-employer
units is to enhance the stability of collective bargaining.88 That
goal is served by the Board's narrow definition of unusual circum-
stances justifying withdrawal.
The Board has interpreted severe economic distress stringently,
requiring a real threat to an employer's economic survival to justify
withdrawal after negotiations begin. Unit fragmentation, resulting
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing NLRB v. Crompton-Highiand Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949);
Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
903 (1969)).
8 50 U.S.L.W. at 4093.
s4 Id.
85 See Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d at 147 & n.21; APPnoPr.ATE BA RGAMNG
UNrr, supra note 32, at 235 ("unions are able to take advantage of the weakest
employers . . . while the stronger bargaining concerns are prevented from dis-
associating themselves from the result.").
8 See supra note 14.
87 See supra note 67.
88In Retail Assocs., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958), the Board noted that it
limited withdrawal to satisfy the statutory requirement of stability. In Connell
Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921 (1974), the Board, discussing group bar-
gaining, stated that it "is always concerned as to stability in the collective-bargaining
relationship." See also Unelko Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 236, 238 (1972), enforced
mere., 478 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1973).
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from separate permanent agrements or union consent to untimely
Withdrawals, permits other association members to withdraw only if
the size of the unit is drastically reduced.
Impasse, by contrast, neither threatens immediate and irrepara-
ble harm nor necessarily comes about through the fault of the
union. Instead, impasse may be viewed as a normal, foreseeable
aspect of bargaining--a point at which economic warfare replaces
negotiation.89 Allowing withdrawal at this time would alter the
balance of economic forces precisely when the need for a stable,
predictable unit is most acute. Moreover, to require the Board
(and the parties) to determine that a statemate that is truly an
impasse, rather than a hiatus, would add further uncertainty.
Recognizing the criticisms of both the impasse doctrine and of
the rule adopted by the Court, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate
dissent in Bonanno. She urged that the NLRB be "required to
analyze, not simply label, a deadlock in negotiations . ... 90
Thus, she would have granted employers the right to withdraw if
the Board found, on a case-by-case basis, a complete breakdown of
negotiations or fragmentation of the bargaining unit.
The problem with the case-by-case analysis suggested by Justice
O'Connor is that it undermines the value of certainty which makes
multi-employer bargaining attractive to individual employers and
to unions. Employers and unions could not be certain whether a
particular situation justified withdrawal; yet the price of guessing
incorrectly would be unfair labor practice penalties.
In short, case-by-case analysis does not further the goals of
multi-employer bargaining-flexibility, stability, and certainty. This
Comment suggests that employer self-regulation best furthers these
goals.
III. A SOLUTION: SELF-REGULATION
A. The Proposal
This Comment proposes self-regulation as a replacement for the
Bonanno Court's rule. Employers who desire to bargain together
should be encouraged to draft a written charter governing their
association.!1 This charter should regulate the governance of the
89 See Note, supra note 71, at 1317.
00 50 U.S.L.W. at 4094 (O'Connor & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
91 In Authorized Air Conditioning v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980), the Ninth Circuit stated that one of its grounds for
refusing to permit employer withdrawal was that the association's by-laws forbade
withdrawal at that juncture. 606 F.2d at 906. The court left open the question
whether violation of the association agreement, without more, would constitute an
1982]
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association, 92 specifying association rules about when withdrawal is
allowed, 93 whether interim or permanent separate agreements are
permissible,9 4 and the processes for resolving internal association
disputes. 95
After association members sign the agreement, the union should
be informed of its contents. The union then could agree to bargain
according to the charter's terms, or negotiate for modifications-a
course consistent with the understanding of Justice Stevens, who
cast the deciding vote in Bonanno.96 Once the union consents, the
unfair labor practice. This case is significant, however, in that the court was guided
by attempted self-regulation and indicated that violation of an association charter
could be grounds for a § 8(a)(5) violation.
92 This charter should list the association's members and the length of time the
charter will be in force. It should include procedures for adding members during
its tenure. With respect to governance, the charter should deal with such issues as
whether decisionmaking power will be distributed equally among members, or
whether larger employers will have a larger voice.
93 The association may want to retain the Board's rule allowing withdrawal in
cases of severe economic distress, but could set more concrete guidelines for the
severity required to permit withdrawal. Cf. Authorized Air Conditioning, 606 F.2d
at 903-04 (withdrawal not permitted within four months of contract termination
date).
94 For example, the association may wish to allow separate agreements concern-
ing local matters, or interim agreements at some precisely defined point of impasse.
95 The association might agree to arbitrate all disputes, or make disagreements
a political matter to be decided by a vote of the association.
96 50 U.S.L.W. at 4091-92 (concurring opinion). justice Stevens' opinion is
discussed infra at note 106.
It should be noted that negotiating over the terms of the charter should not
subject the union or employers' association to certification by the NLBB as a multi-
employer unit. The negotiations over charter terms raise two potential problems.
First, it might be argued that the charter itself would become a bargainable subject
about which the union could strike if it did not receive favorable terms. But because
multi-employer bargaining is a voluntary arrangement, it is not intended that either
party be permitted to use economic force to compel the other's participation. Thus,
a union strike over charter terms should be an unfair labor practice. Cf. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1) (1976) (union cannot coerce employees to bargain through other than
their chosen representative).
Second, it might be contended that the union-association negotiations are sub-
ject to antitrust attack under the doctrine announced in United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Pennington, however, only applies to con-
spiracies between the union and employers to impose terms on employers outside
of the bargaining unit. Thus, the association may represent a group of employers,
or individual employers, without antitrust consequences. It may not, however,
represent a single employer--even the largest and most powerful in a multi-employer
unit-if there is to be an effort to impose the agreed-upon terms on other employers
within that multi-employer unit. See id. 665-67.
If an employer in the association conditioned its membership on a charter term
which the union was able to remove during negotiations, antitrust liability would
not arise provided that the disgruntled employer was permitted to withdraw from
the association. See Bonanno, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4092 (Stevens, J., concurring). That
employer would then return to individual bargaining, and could not contend that
the association was "conspir[ing] to eliminate [it] from the industry......
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665-66.
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agreement should be submitted to the NLRB for its approval. Pro-
vided that the multi-employer unit meets the Board's normal re-
quirements, the Board should certify the unit.
97
Board approval transforms the association into an "employer"
within the meaning of the statute.98 As a statutory employer, the
association gains two methods of enforcing its charter provisions.
If, contrary to the terms of the charter, the union signed a separate
agreement with an individual employer, the union would have re-
fused to bargain.99 Such a refusal would be an unfair labor practice
subjecting the union to a cease and desist order, nullifying the sepa-
rate agreement, and binding the renegade employer to the contract
negotiated through multi-employer bargaining.10°
Alternatively, the association, or any of its members, could
bring a breach of contract action against the offending employer in
a state court.0 1  Rather than ordering that employer to return to
the unit, the court could assess damages. 0 2  These damages could
be calculated based on the profits the settling employer gained at
its colleagues' expense; but because damages would be difficult to
compute, and because a suit would be disruptive to the association,
97 In order to effectuate the private ordering model this Comment advocates,
the NLRB should strike down association charters accepted by unions only if the
charters clearly violate public policy. Board disagreement with the association and
union's view about the proper structure of multi-employer bargaining would not
justify disapproving a charter.
98 See Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938), appeal dismissed sub nom.
AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
99 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 378, 243 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1979), application for
enforcement pending, No. 79-7683 (9th Cir. argued Nov. 5, 1980) (Board held
that a union signing a permanent separate agreement with an employer who, after
negotiations begin, fails to obtain association permission before withdrawing violates
§8(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976)). The rationale of that
case could be extended to cover an employer who violates any provision of the
Association charter.
' 00 See Westchester County Exec. Comm., 142 N.L.R.B. 126 (1963); General
Teamsters Local 324, 127 N.L.R.B. 488 (1960).
101 Whether an individual employer could bring an action to enforce the
agreement, or whether the association should have the exclusive power to sue, is a
subject that should be settled in the charter.
Congress has empowered courts to settle disputes in the labor contract setting.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), (b) (1976). The Supreme Court interpreted the scope
of these sections in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
and held that state courts could also entertain such suits in Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
102 Damages should be preferred because an association charter, contemplating
a continuing relationship between the parties, is not the kind of contract generally
amenable to specific performance.
Because expectation damages would be extremely speculative, restitution should
be the normal measure of damages. An employer resuming operations during a
strike in violation of the association's rules would thus have its profits disgorged.
19821]
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the charter could provide either for mandatory arbitration or for
liquidated damages.
This proposal does not necessarily afford employers and unions
equal withdrawal rights. Contracting about withdrawal rights elimi-
nates the need for Board rules, so balanced withdrawal rights for
the union and employers are not required in the interest of fairness.
The union can accept, reject, or attempt to modify the association
agreement, thus defining withdrawal rights in advance of contract
negotiations. Employers who disagree with the proposed charter can
simply withdraw from the association and bargain individually.
10 3
B. Advantages of the Proposal
Self-regulation's foremost advantage is that it permits employers
and unions to formulate reasonable expectations about the structure
of bargaining, and protects those expectations. As noted earlier,
the Board does not now require that the intent to participate in
multi-employer bargaining be evidenced by a "solemnly executed
document signed and sealed in hot wax." 101 Yet a written contract
has long been recognized as the best way to draw attention to the
fact that parties are entering into a legally binding relationship,
and to encourage them to specify clearly their mutual rights and
obligations.105
1. Employers' Advantages
Employers join together into associations to gain bargaining
leverage against the union, and competitive stability with one an-
other. The present Board rule prevents employers from accurately
predicting whether their goals are served by entering into a bargain-
ing association, because employers may withdraw shortly before
bargaining begins or reach interim agreements with the union dur-
_03 Failure to draft an agreement should subject multi-employer units to the
Board's rules. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. Despite the short-
comings of those rules, failure to agree to bargain under a charter should be viewed
as a decision by the union and employers to "consent" to the Board's approach.
The current rules, however, could be made clearer. For example, the Board could
take a clear stand on whether permanent, separate agreements always results in
unit fragmentation. Cf. Bonanno, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4090 ("where the union . . .
executes separate agreements that will survive unit negotiations, the union has so
'effectively fragmented . . . the bargaining unit' as to create an 'unusual circum-
stance, . . . .") (citations omitted).
104 Joseph McDaniel, 226 N.L.R.B. at 853.
105 See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adiudication, 89 HAv.
L. REv. 1685, 1691-92 (1976); of. 3 J. WmIlsTON, CoNTRAcTs § 448 (3d ed. 1960)
(purpose of statute of frauds).
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ing negotiations. The former step disrupts other association mem-
bers' plans for joint bargaining; the latter destroys the premise of
mutual support. The impasse doctrine fails to alleviate these prob-
lems, allowing employers to manipulate negotiations into impasse,
and then withdraw.
Self-regulation allows every employer group to protect its
unique concerns. If employers desire a group in which association
bargaining is limited to certain areas, they may specify in their
charter that engaging in that bargaining will not make them a unit
for all purposes. Employers who desire a loosely structured group
can specify in their charter that withdrawal is permitted at any
time (whether or not negotiations have begun).
Those employers who prefer a more structured group can de-
sign a charter limiting withdrawal even more strictly than does the
Bonanno Court's rule. For example, the charter might bar with-
drawal for its duration; or, less stringently, it might prohibit with-
drawal from one or two months before contract negotiations are
scheduled to begin. The agreement could regulate unit disruption
by forbidding separate agreements of any kind-permanent or in-
terim. To compensate for such strictness, the duration of the
charter could be brief. Upon its expiration, employers dissatisfied
with its terms could attempt to modify the charter or could leave
the association. Thus, the parties' own decisions, not the Board's
balancing of economic interests and weapons, will be honored.
2. Advantages to Unions
Like employers, unions would benefit from an increase in the
stability and predictability of bargaining units. Unions benefit
from predictability by taking advantage of economies of scale, and
by engaging in more far-reaching bargaining.
The union's most important benefit is furthering its goal of
security. The union would know precisely when, if ever, it could
negotiate with individual employers without causing fragmentation
of the unit and a consequent return to individual bargaining.
Finally, the union would benefit from the new bargaining
leverage it would receive from the adoption of self-regulation. The
union could consent to charter terms important to the association in
exchange for association concessions on wages or working conditions.
3. Benefits From Enhanced Stability
The reduced temptation for individual employers to withdraw
resulting from self-regulation would benefit the association, the
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union, and the public. The instability stemming from changing
economic conditions would be lessened by specifying the length of
the agreement, rather than letting it exist indefinitely. Pressures
for withdrawal based on dissension between employers over bargain-
ing strategy would be dissipated by an agreement about the process
for resolving disputes.
The pressures for withdrawal that result from the changing
composition of multi-employer bargaining units would also be mini-
mized through self-regulation. If the association agreement pre-
vented the union from negotiating separate agreements, a major
source of intra-association frustration and resentment would be
avoided. Thus, employers can-by a term of the charter-organize
themselves to insure that "they will hang together for the long
pull." 106
The public would also benefit from the labor peace derived
from increased stability and more informed long-range planning by
unions and employers. Yet the public would be protected from
excessive collusion between employers by the antitrust laws, and
from agreements between unions and employers violative of public
policy by the requirement of NLRB ratification.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unions and employers agree to bargain on an association-wide
basis because they expect stability in the unit and flexibility in
negotiations. If those expectations are frustrated, pressures for with-
drawal build. The Board's rule, because it fails to maintain flexi-
bility in regulating withdrawal, frustrates expectations and leads to
instability in bargaining units. Yet the response to the Board's rule,
106 S. G ,urr & L. Trawp, supra note 19, at 60.
Justice Stevens, who cast the deciding vote in Bonanno, endorsed a model
closely approaching this Comment's suggestion. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4091-92 (concur-
ring opinion). Justice Stevens emphasized the voluntary nature of multi-employer
bargaining and the need for association members to indicate an "unequivocal in-
tention to be bound in collective bargaining by group rather than individual
action. ... Id. 4091 (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 299, 299 (1967),
enforced, 398 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). Thus, Justice Stevens stated that:
"Absent such an unequivocal commitment to be bound by group action, any
employer is free to withdraw from group negotiation at any time, or simply to
reject the terms of the final group contract." Id. He read the Court's opinion to
"not preclude an employer from explicitly conditioning its participation in group
bargaining on any special terms of its own design." Id.
Justice Stevens then gave the example of an association refusing to participate
in multi-employer bargaining unless the union accepted a term permitting with-
drawal at impasse, and discussed the consequences of the union's refusal to accept
that term. His view, like that suggested by this Comment, is that employers and
unions should be permitted to tailor the structure and terms of multi-employer bar-
gaining to their precise needs.
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the impasse doctrine, likewise contributes to instability by allowing
employers to manipulate negotiating stalemates and thus to destroy
the unit.
Self-regulation provides a means of vindicating the goals of
flexibility, stability, and certainty for both employers and unions.
Self-regulation permits each party to arrange a framework for nego-
tiations tailored to its particular goals. Unexpected disintegrations
are minimized, so that the association and the union can concentrate
on the success of the bargaining process instead of the possible
breakdown of the unit. Given the two means of enforcing the
association charter, employers will be reluctant to take steps that
might subject them to liability. Thus, emphasis will be on bargain-
ing and not on withdrawal.
